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13 DEC 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Director-Comptroller**SUBJECT: Dissemination of Non-CIA Cables****REFERENCE: Your Memorandum on the Above Subject,
dated 3 November 1967**

1. In line with the referent memorandum, all components of the Clandestine Services were canvassed to determine which if any, of the subjects in the guideline lists currently on record with the Department of State, DIA and NMCC could be eliminated or revised.
2. The results of the survey within the Clandestine Services clearly indicate that we cannot do without any of the specified subjects, particularly since they are couched in such broad terms. As far as we can determine, attempting to develop a more refined breakdown of the subject matter would only complicate the problem, because any such refinement would be more difficult to administer, both at State and Defense, as well as at the receiving end in the Cable Secretariat. While our survey indicated that some adjustment downward will be possible in the number of copies needed by some components on some of the subjects, and the Cable Secretariat is being so advised, no one category on the guideline lists can be totally eliminated for the Clandestine Services as a whole.
3. I am certain that you will agree that the Clandestine Services components must continue to receive cable traffic on these broad categories if they are to remain adequately informed on subjects for which they are held responsible. The components must be continually aware of reporting from all sources, even if

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some of it may be marginal, in order to direct more effectively their own activities and to evaluate better their results.

4. As you are undoubtedly aware, we are examining the internal distribution of our own cable traffic and have held several informal discussions with representatives of your committee examining the Agency's cable traffic problem. We recognize there are no easy solutions to the problems involved in the "information explosion" but want to assure you we will be doing what we can to assist in easing the load on the Cable Secretariat, the Office of Communications and on ourselves.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Dissemination of Non-CIA Cables

I have had DDI requirements for non-CIA cables reviewed during the past month in the light of your 3 November memorandum on the subject. I regret to report that we can suggest no revision of the Cable Secretary's Guideline Lists that would in any way reduce the flow of these messages through the Cable Secretariat. I attach a detailed report of our findings.

/s/ R. J. Smith

R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment

cc: Cable Secretary

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11 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : DDI Requirements for Non-CIA Cables

In response to the Executive Director's request, I have personally conducted a review of current DDI cable requirements, assisted by the Information Requirements Staff and the DDI Planning Staff. Our review included consultations with all the DDI offices concerned; it was facilitated by the fact that DDI offices have already been engaged in a stringent review and revision of internal requirements at the request of the Cable Secretary. I also examined a full day's take of non-CIA cables provided by the Cable Secretary. Our conclusions follow:

1. The Cable Secretariat guidelines for selection of State and DOD cables are about the optimum that can be achieved. If they were made more general (as many DDI analysts desire), the flow of cables would increase; if they were made more specific, the Cable Secretariat's selection task would become even more difficult. The categories of cables listed in the guidelines have already been pruned during the past year in response to earlier Cable Secretariat appeals.
2. My examination of the actual cables received during a typical day indicated that DDI and DDS&T reading requirements together account for about 90% of the non-CIA cables received, with DDS and DDP requirements accounting for the rest. (I found that perhaps 5% of the cables in the collection were not responsive to any guideline requirements and were the result of careless selection by the State and DOD readers.)

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3. I made a particularly careful examination of those cables I identified as being responsive to DDI requirements but of marginal value to the analyst; I could find no way to rephrase the applicable guideline that would not have 1) required amplification of the guideline and more careful reading by the Cable Secretariat analyst, or 2) eliminated from selection similar but essential messages.

4. Thus, even though our offices are continuing their re-examination and revision of their reading requirements placed on the Cable Secretariat, I do not expect that this will enable the Cable Secretary to eliminate or restrict the guidelines he provides State and Defense; on the contrary, this review could result in the creation of additional guidelines necessary to bring in traffic which analysts complain they are not now receiving.

5. From a strictly editorial point of view, the guidelines might well be revised: the order of the listing is somewhat incongruous, and the reference to the Sino-Soviet Bloc is outdated. But the guidelines have been painstakingly built up in the teeth of resistance by State and Defense to enlarging our share of their reporting, and we are unwilling to tamper with the lists unnecessarily.

6. In short, DDI offices continue to require essentially all those non-CIA cables now being received. The consumers of DDI finished intelligence services, notably the White House and the Secretary of Defense, expect us to have all available pieces of any particular puzzle, even pieces which may seem innocuous to the non-expert. State and Defense are major collectors of intelligence information, more so even than the Clandestine Services, and our production offices cannot do without their cabled contributions. Similarly, information processors and managers like CRS, and IRS need to see all cables dealing with their areas of concern. Underlying this attitude is the assumption that only information considered especially important or timely is supposed to be transmitted by field collectors through electrical communications channels.

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
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7. Pending a community attack on the information explosion at its source (as discussed in the Inspector General's Report on Foreign Intelligence Requirements), we see no present alternative to accommodating CIA cable handling facilities to what appears to be a built-in annual increase in the flow of non-CIA cables.



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DDS&T-4854-67

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Dissemination of Non-CIA Cables

REFERENCE : Executive Director-Comptroller
Memo dated 3 Nov 67, above subject

1. Based upon a review of non-CIA messages received from the Cable Secretariat the Offices of this Directorate, with one exception, have indicated to me that their current requirements appear to be properly expressed and reflect actual needs. The Office of Scientific Intelligence has been in the process of a lengthy and detailed review of its requirements. This review is scheduled for completion soon after the first of the year. Should it reveal any categories of cable traffic of marginal value which can be eliminated the Cable Secretariat will be so advised.

2. We share your concern in the increasing volume of messages processed and will continue with periodic reviews in an effort to reduce our requirements.

CARL E. DUCKETT
Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology

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